‘Othering’, Theodicy and Social Influence: An Ontological Deliberation – Julie Reich

Augustine’s contributions to the theory of original sin embody a deterministic view, insinuated as a result of the causal relationship between the root of evil and its human origin. Specifically, Augustine uses the Garden of Eden to demonstrate the appearance of evil resulted from the onset of human creation. In my opinion attributing responsibility to an out-group, or Othering creates an internal conflict commonly acknowledged within the discipline of Social Psychology as cognitive dissonance.

In general, cognitive dissonance is broadly understood as a condition of anxiety or tension as a result of having inconsistent, contradictory, or conflicting cognition (ideas, attitudes, and/or beliefs) with the associated behaviour. Generally speaking, the theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance to maintain the self-concept, and do so by changing their attitudes and beliefs in order to be compatible with the associated behaviours. As a result of this psychological phenomenon, it can be deduced that an example of Othering is illustrated as it relates to a cognitive behavioural solution to, or manifestation of an internal conflict between beliefs derived from the theory of original sin (humans are inherently evil) and a desire to maintain beliefs, attitudes and behaviours that reinforce positive self regard. According to these deductions, Othering functions to preserve the self-concept whereby beliefs, attitudes and behaviours related to lack of personal responsibility are justified and blame is externalized. As a result, a scapegoat effect not only functions as a means to avoid assuming personal responsibility but also as a means to preserve positive self-regard and to avoid discomfort from conflicting beliefs and behaviours as a result of cognitive dissonance. The result of these insinuations, the deterministic causal relationship between the root of evil and human nature, is remedied by behaviour deemed socially acceptable by religious authority. A modern example would be American Islamophobia (cognition and behaviours) as a result of ‘The war against terrorism’.

The Book of Job can be interpreted to reinforce such an example, where allocation of blame and Othering are byproducts of punishment. Specifically in terms of righteousness, disobedience and sin, within the biblical moral universe, transgression against God affects everyone. As a result, the causes or reasons for suffering may not be known or clear. In the Book of Job, God doesn’t only punish wicked people but also inflicts pain on people to help them. Within the confines of this assumption, these interpretations support the existence of evil as correlationally and causally determined within a divine context. Accordingly, this association aids neglect, avoidance and active disregard for asserting personal responsibility for forms of suffering such as Othering by displacing blame in conjunction with the authority of doctrinal support.

Due to the inherent dichotomy between good and evil, God versus the Satan etc., when considering the problem of evil, the deterministic causal relationship between human nature and evil elicits the “nurture” or learned aspect of evil, or “Sin out of action”. In other words, if humans are predisposed to evil, it does not require learning. However, empirical evidence supports the notion that human cognitive and behavioural development is influenced by genetic and by environmental factors. Consequently, the idea that infant baptism rids or saves an infant of original sin, for instance, is confounded by recent empirical understandings regarding the nature/nurture debate. Essentially, if human development is influenced by genetic and by environmental factors, ‘evil’ must be at least partially learned; evil is a social phenomenon (such as with cognitive dissonance) and is a product of the norms and values embedded within the environment or society from which one is raised. As a result, we cannot escape the environmental role over the development of evil. In other words, the variation of evil is a product of social variation. Specifically, because cognition and behaviour vary according to the status quo, evil is not only understood by the degree of suffering, but how people perceive it. Accordingly, if evil is determined by the context and by the status quo, and norms vary depending on social and cultural variation, evil cannot be universal and must therefore be culturally determined. This insinuation indicates and reinforces the notion that the origin of human suffering is human existence itself. As a result, humans are responsible for suffering. Consequently, asserting human responsibility for evil and suffering is not dismissible. Ultimately, a deterministic causal relationship exists between our inability to escape our social worlds, and the influence of society over ‘evil’.

However, the film Scared Sacred, for example, demonstrates the human capacity for resilience and grace in the form of creativity (through community, the role of children, narratives, redemption, acts of resistance, remembrance, hope and choice) in the face of evil and suffering. Consequently, the usefulness of practical applications of concerns arising from theodicy is reinforced. In other words, because the variation of evil is a product of social variation, and society can change, so can evil. Ideally, social change would elicit a reduction of evil as a result.

Accordingly, practical applications of concerns arising from theodicy, such as manifestations of evil include a solution-based approach rather than ones that are problem-focused. The article ‘Modern Religious Approaches to Evil’ reinforces this notion. It is suggested that a multitude of factors contribute to human existence, including those that are evil (Kelly, F., J., p. 220). Consequently, human existence, in part, is indebted to evil. In the article, questions arising from gratuitous evil are remedied by suggesting good things arise from some genuinely evil events (Kelly, F., J., p. 220). However, in my opinion, concepts such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ cannot be polarized because they are subjective ideals rather than tangible, measurable or controllable things. Moreover, since a dichotomy fundamentally forces polar extremes and the notion of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is conceptual, culturally specific and co-varies with prescriptive socially determined elements, they are not measurable, tangible or universal. Therefore, ‘good versus evil’ cannot be part of one supreme divine existence, split by two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ideals. This use of polarities in theodicy appears to permeate all western religions. For example, long-standing debate over the origin of suffering and evil, according to Muslim tradition for instance, is split between fatalism and free will, a dichotomy of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in terms of their cause. Consequently, manifestations of dichotomy in theodicy are not measurable empirically, and as a result, obstruct practical application toward solution-based approaches. It would therefore be beneficial to apply empirically supported mediation and conflict resolution techniques to educate, reduce and resolve manifestations of evil and suffering rather than ponder over religious implications involving the existence of God and the dichotomy between good and evil, such as what I have done thus far!

Ultimately, the predicament I now face as a result of these conclusions brings me to back to an initial point: that the implications of a deterministic causal attribution facilitate Othering by ascribing responsibility to human nature. Am I now just as guilty of Othering? Have I not just inferred a deterministic causal relationship between our inability to escape our social worlds and the influence of society on ‘evil’? If I have pointed a finger and attributed evil to human nature, what does that make me?

Works Cited

Kelly, Joseph F. “Modern Religious Approaches to Evil” in The Problem of Evil in the Western Tradition: From the Book of Job to Modern Genetics. Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 2002.

Scared Sacred. Dir. Velcrow Ripper. 2006.